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Mutual funds change their risk levels significantly over time. This paper investigates the performance
consequences of risk shifting, as well as the economic motivations and the mechanisms of risk shifting.
Using a holdings-based measure of risk shifting, we find that funds that increase risk perform worse
than funds that keep stable risk levels over time. In addition, funds that expect higher benefits from
risk shifting are more likely to increase risk and perform particularly poorly after increasing risk. Our
results are consistent with the notion that agency problems, rather than the ability to take advantage
of changing investment opportunities, are the likely motivation behind risk shifting behavior.
Jennifer Huang
University of Texas at Austin
McCombs School of Business




University of Texas at Austin
McCombs School of Business





University of Texas at Austin
McCombs School of Business
1 University Station; B6600
Austin, TX 78712
hanjiang.zhang@mccombs.utexas.edu1 Introduction
Mutual funds change their total risk exposure substantially over time. Using the disclosed
holdings of a sample of 2,335 U.S. equity funds over the period between 1980 and 2006, we
document that 27.1% of equity mutual funds change their annualized volatility by more than
2.5% in a given quarter, and 9.6% of funds change their volatility by more than 5%. These
changes are signi¯cant given that their average long-term volatility level is only 17.9%. Our
paper studies whether funds that shift risk exhibit di®erent subsequent performance compared
to funds with more consistent risk levels. We further investigate the economic motivations
behind risk shifting and the mechanisms through which risk shifters add or destroy value.
Mutual funds change their risk levels for two potential reasons, which have di®erent perfor-
mance consequences. First, the literature on delegated portfolio management has identi¯ed
a potential agency con°ict between mutual fund companies and their investors. Whereas
fund investors would like their mutual funds to maximize risk-adjusted returns, mutual fund
companies would like to maximize their pro¯ts. Since their pro¯ts depend primarily on the
amount of assets under management, mutual funds might have incentives to follow investment
policies that generate money in°ows even if these policies reduce the risk-adjusted returns to
their investors. For example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison
(1997) suggest that mutual fund companies strategically change their risk levels to attract
additional fund in°ows due to the convex °ow-performance relation.1 If agency problems are
the main cause behind risk shifting, then we should not expect superior performance for risk
shifting funds. To the extent that opportunistic risk shifting causes trading costs, constrains
the investment opportunity sets, and distracts fund managers from their goal of investing in
the most promising securities, we should expect risk shifters to perform worse.
The second reason funds change their risk levels is that fund managers might actively adjust
the composition of their portfolios to capitalize on time-varying investment opportunities. If
1Additional papers on the °ow-performance relation include Ippolito (1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1997),
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Zheng (1999), DelGuercio and Tkac (2002), Lynch and Musto (2003), Nanda, Wang,
and Zheng (2004), Huang, Wei, and Yan (2007), and Ivkovich and Weisbenner (2009).
1funds that actively shift risk have superior investment abilities, then they should perform
better than funds that have more stable risk exposures. If, on the other hand, funds with
inferior investment abilities are more prone to shift risk (because, for example, they erroneously
believe that they have timing ability or lack the con¯dence to maintain a stable trading
strategy), then funds that shift risk should perform worse.
To measure risk shifting of mutual funds, we propose a holdings-based measure that is
de¯ned as the di®erence between a fund's current holdings volatility and its past realized
volatility. The current holdings volatility is the standard deviation of the most recently dis-
closed fund holdings, and the past realized volatility is the standard deviation of the fund's
actual return. A fund has a positive risk shifting measure if the most recently disclosed
holdings are riskier than the actual fund holdings.
We sort mutual funds into portfolios according to their most recent risk shifting measure
and compare their subsequent performance. We ¯nd that funds that increase risk the most
perform signi¯cantly worse (with an annualized abnormal return of -2.6% using the Carhart
model) than funds that maintain stable risk levels (with an abnormal return of -0.7%). These
results are robust using alternative performance measures. The poor performance of risk
shifters suggests that they are unlikely to possess superior ability. Instead, risk shifting be-
havior is either an indication of inferior ability or is motivated by agency problems in delegated
portfolio management.
To investigate the potential role of agency problems in risk shifting behavior, we ask
whether the propensity to shift risk and the performance consequences of risk shifting di®er
across funds with di®erent bene¯ts of risk shifting. The expected pro¯t of a mutual fund
increases with both the expense ratio and the assets under management. Thus, funds with
higher expense ratios have more to gain from shifting risk. In addition, the literature has
identi¯ed younger, smaller funds, and funds that belong to smaller fund families as having
a more sensitive °ow-performance relation. Hence, these funds also enjoy larger expected
bene¯ts of risk shifting. Based on these characteristics, we separate funds into subgroups and
2¯nd that funds with larger bene¯ts of risk shifting are more likely to shift risk and perform
particularly poorly after shifting risk. For example, 14.7% of funds with above-median expense
ratios increase their volatility by more than 2.5% and experience a Carhart alpha of -2.9% per
year, whereas only 10.5% of funds with below-median expense ratios increase their volatility
by the same amount and experience a Carhart alpha of -1.2%. Similarly, younger, smaller
funds and funds that belong to smaller fund families are more likely to shift risk and experience
more severe performance consequences when they shift risk.
To understand the sources of the poor performance of risk shifters, we study the various
mechanisms through which funds can change risk: First, funds can shift risk by changing the
composition between equity holdings and cash holdings. Second, within their equity holdings,
funds can shift risk by changing their exposure to systematic risk (e.g., by switching between
low beta stocks and high beta stocks). Third, funds can shift risk by changing their exposure
to idiosyncratic risk (e.g., by concentrating the holdings on a few positions or industries).
We ¯nd evidence that all of these mechanisms are important in explaining the risk shifting
behavior of mutual funds. In contrast, the performance consequences are signi¯cant mainly for
funds increasing idiosyncratic risk exposure, whereas both the reduction in cash holdings and
the increase in systematic risk lead to only mild reductions in fund performance. Thus, the
poor performance of risk shifters is driven not by the unsuccessful attempts of fund managers
to time the aggregate market but by their desire to take on idiosyncratic risks. We also
sort funds into subgroups with di®erent turnover to study the impact of transaction costs.
Surprisingly, the poor performance of risk shifters is concentrated in low turnover funds. To
the extent that turnover is a proxy for trading costs, our ¯nding suggests that direct trading
costs are unlikely the main driver of risk shifters' poor performance.
Several studies have identi¯ed a convex °ow-performance relation, in which mutual fund in-
vestors tend to invest in funds with stellar performance and do not penalize poor performance
equivalently. This convex °ow-performance relation motivates mutual funds to strategically
shift risk levels to attract additional fund °ows. For example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks
3(1996) suggest that mutual funds compete with each other in a tournament and might ma-
nipulate fund risk depending on their prior performance. In particular, they show that funds
with poor past performance tend to increase their risk levels. Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
analyze the convex °ow-performance relation and ¯nd evidence that mutual funds that are
well ahead of their peers also have an incentive to increase risk to make lists of \top per-
formers." Koski and Ponti® (1999) con¯rm this risk shifting behavior and suggest that risk
levels of mutual funds might also change in response to unpredictable fund °ows. Further-
more, as discussed by Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007), fund managers have
an incentive to change risk levels to manipulate their performance numbers. Recently, several
theoretical and empirical studies have improved our understanding of risk shifting behavior
of mutual funds.2 Our paper contributes to this literature by investigating the consequences
of risk shifting on fund performance, which have not previously been analyzed. Studying the
performance consequences of risk shifting gives us important insights into the motivations for
risk shifting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 derives our holdings-
based measure of risk shifting. Section 3 explains the data sources and gives some basic
summary statistics. Section 4 describes the characteristics of risk shifters and the mechanisms
of shifting risk. Section 5 documents a negative relation between risk shifting and subsequent
fund performance. Sections 6 and 7 investigate the motivations behind risk shifting and the
sources of risk shifters' poor performance. Section 8 uses a multivariate regression analysis to
control for additional fund characteristics and Section 9 concludes.
2Additional papers on risk shifting include Starks (1987), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Carpenter (2000),
Busse (2001), Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2003), Palomino and Prat (2003), Ross (2004), Elton, Gruber, Krasny,
and Ozelge (2006), Li and Tiwari (2006), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), Guasoni, Huberman, and Wang
(2007), Massa and Patgiri (2007), Kempf and Ruenzi (2008), Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele (2008), Hu, Kale,
Pagani, and Subramanian (2008), and Chen and Pennacchi (2009).
42 Risk Shifting Measure
Mutual funds can change the total risk of their portfolio by holding assets with di®erent risk
properties or by changing the diversi¯cation level of their overall portfolio. To capture the
risk shifting behavior of mutual funds, we examine their portfolio holdings. We measure risk
shifting of a mutual fund f at time t by comparing the current holdings volatility based on
the fund's most recently disclosed positions ¾H
f;t with the past realized volatility based on the







The return of mutual fund f at time t is the scalar product of the portfolio weight wf;t
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The variance of the returns of mutual fund f at time t depends on the weights invested in
the various assets and on the N £ N variance-covariance matrix of the individual assets §.
The variance of a portfolio can be determined by either computing the variance of the portfolio
returns or by pre- and post-multiplying the variance-covariance matrix of the underlying stock








To estimate the current holdings volatility of fund f at time t, we compute the square root
of VAR(RFf;t) by estimating the sample standard deviation of the return of a hypothetical
portfolio that holds the most recently disclosed fund positions over the prior 36 months. This
method is equivalent to calculating the square root of w0
f;t§twf;t.
5The past realized volatility of fund f at time t is estimated as the sample standard devi-
ation of the actual fund returns over the prior 36 months. It captures the total risk of the
actual positions. The realized volatility is identical to the current holdings volatility if a fund
maintains constant portfolio weights over the prior 36 months.
The risk shifting measure RS is positive if the most recently disclosed holdings exhibit
a higher volatility than the actual fund holdings over the prior 36 months and is negative
otherwise. Thus, a positive risk shifting measure indicates that a mutual fund increases
the portfolio risk, which is achievable either by holding assets with higher risk levels or by
concentrating its portfolio more.
Most previous papers analyze risk shifting by comparing the standard deviations of the
returns of mutual funds over two non-overlapping time periods.3 Comparing risk levels of a
fund over two non-overlapping time periods may capture the exogenous changes in market
conditions rather than the intentional changes in portfolio risk, especially during periods of
dramatic market movements. By using identical time periods to estimate both the current
holdings volatility and the realized volatility for a fund, our measure of risk shifting is designed
to capture the changes in risk levels induced by changes in the portfolio composition and is
una®ected by changes in market conditions.
One potential concern of our risk shifting measure is that our measure might capture the
impact of interim trades, window dressing, or other unobserved actions, since the current
holdings volatility is based on disclosed holdings returns and the realized volatility is based
on realized fund returns. In Section 7, we introduce several alternative risk shifting measures,
one of which (the equity-based risk shifting measure) is based solely on disclosed holdings and
is de¯ned as the di®erence between the volatility of current equity holdings and the volatility
of past equity holdings. The results are similar using these alternative measures.
3See for example, Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), Koski and Ponti® (1999), Busse (2001), and Elton,
Gruber, and Blake (2003). On the other hand, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Kempf, Ruenzi, and Thiele
(2008) do use mutual fund holdings data to compute changes in risk levels.
63 Data and Summary Statistics
This section explains the data sources and describes the main characteristics of mutual funds
in our sample.
3.1 Sample Selection
For our empirical analysis, we merge the CRSP Survivorship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database
with the Thomson Financial CDA/Spectrum holdings database and the CRSP stock price
data using the MFLINKS ¯le based on Wermers (2000) and available through the Wharton
Research Data Services. Our sample covers the time period between 1980 and 2006. The CRSP
mutual fund database includes information on fund returns, total assets under management,
di®erent types of fees, investment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The Thomson
Financial database provides long positions in domestic common stock holdings of mutual
funds. The data are collected both from reports ¯led by mutual funds with the SEC and
from voluntary reports generated by the funds. During most of our sample period, funds
are required by law to disclose their holdings semi-annually. Nevertheless, about 78% of the
observations are from the most recent quarter and only 3% of the holdings are more than two
quarters old.
We focus our analysis on actively-managed domestic equity mutual funds for which the
holdings data are most complete and reliable. Therefore, we eliminate balanced, bond, money
market, international, and index funds.4 We also exclude funds which in the previous month
manage less than $5 million and funds that did not disclose their holdings in the previous 36
months. For funds with multiple share classes, we compute fund-level variables by aggregating
across the di®erent share classes.5
4First, we select funds with the following S&P objectives: AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, SCG, ENV, FIN,
GLD, HLT, NTR, RLE, SEC, TEC, UTI. If a fund does not have any of the above objectives, we select funds
with the following ICDI objectives: AG, GI, LG, IN, PM, SF or UT. If a fund has neither the S&P nor the
ICDI objective, then we go to the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick funds with the following objectives:
G, G-I, IEQ, GCI, LTG, MCG, SCG, GPM, HLT, TCH, or UTL. If none of these objectives are available and
the fund has the CS or SPEC policy, then the fund will be included. Index funds are identi¯ed based on their
names.
5Our sample focuses on actively-managed domestic equity mutual funds, for which the holdings data are
73.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes. Our sample includes 2,335
distinct funds and 184,519 fund-month observations with a valid risk shifting measure RS.
The number of funds ranges from 141 (April 1983) to 1,559 (October 2006). Since we need 36
months of prior fund return data to compute the risk shifting measure, we lose the ¯rst three
years of the return histories of all mutual funds. Thus, our ¯nal sample covers the period
between 1983 and 2006.
We report summary statistics on fund total net assets (TNA), age, expense ratio, turnover,
asset allocations, and net investor returns based on the CRSP mutual fund data. Based on
the CRSP data we compute the fund °ow (FLOW), which is de¯ned as the growth rate of
the assets under management after adjusting for the appreciation of the mutual fund's assets
(RFt), assuming that all the cash °ows are invested at the end of the period:
FLOWf;t =
TNAf;t ¡ TNAf;t¡1(1 + RFf;t)
TNAf;t¡1
: (4)
Since estimated fund °ows are very volatile, we winsorize both the top and the bottom parts
of the distribution at the 1% level.
The average investor return of mutual funds in our sample equals 0.83% per month. We
compute the gross holdings return based on the most recently disclosed quarter-end Thomson
equity holdings and the asset allocation weights from CRSP. The holdings database includes
only long positions in domestic common stocks and excludes other non-equity holdings. Since
we focus our analysis on equity mutual funds, these disclosed holdings compose the vast
majority of fund assets (91.28%), with the remaining assets invested in cash (6.26%) and
other non-equity holdings (2.46%) including bonds, preferred stocks, and other securities. We
proxy for these asset returns using published indices. For bonds and preferred stocks we use
the total return of the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index; for cash holdings and other
most complete and reliable. In unreported results we show that the results are slightly stronger if we include
all funds which are listed in the MFLINKS ¯le that matches CRSP with Thomson. The results are not a®ected
substantially if we exclude sector funds or include index funds.
8assets we use the Treasury bill rate. The gross holdings return has a mean of 0.91% per month
and a correlation of 95.5% with the net investor return across the mutual funds in our sample.
Important determinants of the risk level of a fund are the number of stocks and the
concentration of stocks in particular industries. The number of stocks is computed based
on the holdings information from Thomson Financial and the Industry Concentration Index
(ICI) is computed following Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005) as the concentration of the
stock portfolio in ten broadly de¯ned industries.6
Table 1 also summarizes holdings-based style characteristics for the mutual funds in our
sample. We group fund holdings according to their size, book-to-market, and momentum
characteristics as proposed by Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997) and Wermers
(2003). Each stock listed in CRSP is grouped into respective quintiles according to its market
value (using NYSE cuto® levels), its industry-adjusted book-to-market ratio, and its lagged
one-year return. Using the quintile information, we compute the value-weighted size, value,
and momentum scores for each mutual fund in each period. For example, a mutual fund that
invests one half of its value in stocks in the largest size quintile and the other half in stocks
in the second largest size quintile has a size score of 4.5. Mutual funds in our sample tend to
hold stocks in the largest size quintile and have a slight bias towards growth and momentum
stocks.
The last three rows of Table 1 report the current holdings volatility, the past realized
volatility, and the risk shifting measure, as de¯ned in Section 2. To compute the current
holdings volatility, we exclude the holdings of stocks that do not have complete return histories
over the prior 36 months. Both the current holdings volatility and the realized volatility are
computed and updated at a quarterly frequency. The current holdings volatility and the
realized volatility have similar means (17.54% and 17.86% per year, respectively) and a high









f;t is the value weight of the stocks held by the mutual fund in the j-th industry and w
j
f;t is the weight of the
CRSP total market portfolio corresponding to the j-th industry. Industry concentration is measured across
ten broadly de¯ned industries as summarized in Table AI of Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005).
9correlation of 0.83. The risk shifting measure has a mean close to zero and an annualized
standard deviation of 4.58%, which is about one quarter of the average realized volatility.
Thus, mutual funds shift risk signi¯cantly.
To test whether the current holdings volatility is a good proxy for the future realized
volatility of a mutual fund, in unreported analysis we regress the future 12-month realized
volatility of a mutual fund on the current holdings volatility and the past realized volatility
over the prior 36 months. We ¯nd that the coe±cient on the current holdings volatility is
larger and more statistically signi¯cant than the coe±cient on the past realized volatility.
Thus, the current holdings volatility captures an important aspect of the future risk exposure.
4 Characterization of Risk Shifting
This section discusses the characteristics of risk shifters and clari¯es the main mechanisms
through which mutual funds shift risk.
4.1 Characteristics of Risk Shifters
To identify the characteristics of risk shifters, we sort all mutual funds in each quarter into
¯ve portfolios according to the most recent RS measure and compute average characteristics
of these funds. Funds in Portfolio 1 (5) decrease (increase) risk by more than 2.5% per year
and compose 14% (13%) of our sample, whereas funds in Portfolio 3 change risk by less than
1% and compose 41% of our sample.7
Table 2 summarizes the characteristics of mutual funds sorted according to the RS mea-
sure. Funds in Portfolio 1 decrease risk on average by 5.60% per year, which is approximately
26% of their realized volatility over the prior 36 months. On the other hand, funds in Portfo-
lio 5 increase risk by 4.75% per year, which is also approximately 26% of their prior realized
volatility. Thus, funds exhibit signi¯cant changes in their overall risk levels over time.
The current holdings volatility and the realized volatility contribute asymmetrically to
7The results in the paper are similar if the mutual funds are sorted into decile portfolios instead.
10the RS measure across di®erent RS portfolios. Funds in Portfolio 5 exhibit high current
holdings volatility, and their realized volatility is not very di®erent from the mean realized
volatility. On the other hand, funds in Portfolio 1 have high realized volatility, and their
current holdings volatility is not substantially di®erent from the mean holdings volatility.
Thus, funds in Portfolio 5 increase their total risk signi¯cantly from the average risk level and
funds in Portfolio 1 reduce their total risk from their elevated levels back to the average. This
asymmetric pattern suggests that increasing volatility is more of an active choice for funds
while decreasing volatility is driven more by the reversion back to the mean risk level.
Most fund characteristics exhibit a U or inverse-U pattern, which indicates that funds that
increase risk share similar characteristics to funds that decrease risk. Funds that shift risk
are smaller, younger, charge higher expense ratios, and have higher turnover than funds with
more consistent risk levels.
4.2 Mechanism of Risk Shifting
Mutual funds have several potential mechanisms through which they change the riskiness of
their portfolios. First, they can change the composition between equity holdings and cash
holdings. Second, within their equity holdings, funds can change their exposure to systematic
risks by switching between low beta stocks and high beta stocks. Third, funds can change
their idiosyncratic risk exposures by changing the number of stocks or the concentration in
particular industries and styles.
Table 3 summarizes the initial characteristics (Panel A) and the changes in the character-
istics (Panel B) of mutual funds in the various RS portfolios. The initial levels are de¯ned as
the average values of the various characteristics over the prior three years and the changes are
de¯ned as the di®erences in characteristics between the most recent quarter and the average
over the prior three years.
Funds with more consistent risk exposures have lower market betas despite holding smaller
cash positions than funds which shift risk. Risk shifters have higher initial levels of idiosyn-
11cratic volatility and hold more concentrated portfolios as re°ected by the lower number of
stocks and the higher industry concentration index. Risk shifters also di®er in their style ex-
posure from funds with more consistent risk exposures as they focus their holdings on small,
growth, and momentum stocks.
Panel B indicates that the changes in the various characteristics are monotonic across the
RS portfolios and illustrate the multiple mechanisms through which mutual funds change risk.
For example, funds that increase risk tend to reduce their cash holdings, increase market risk
exposure, increase idiosyncratic risk exposure by reducing the number of stock positions or in-
creasing their industry concentration levels, and increase their holdings of small capitalization,
growth, and momentum stocks.
Figure 1 depicts the persistence of the RS measure four quarters before and eight quarters
after the formation of the ¯ve RS portfolios. Risk shifting builds up gradually over the year
prior to the portfolio formation and dissipates to a large extend two years after the portfolio
formation. The short-term persistence in risk shifting occurs partly because the persistence in
trading strategies and partly because the past realized volatility is based on overlapping data.
Over longer horizons, however, it would be di±cult for mutual funds to consistently increase
or decrease risk. We frequently observe that funds in one of the extreme portfolios switch to
the other extreme, while funds with stable risk levels tend to remain in the middle portfolios.
5 Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting
This section compares the performance of funds that shift risk with the performance of funds
with more stable risk properties. We use various performance measures to evaluate fund
performance.
At the end of each month we sort mutual funds into portfolios according to their most
recent RS measure. We compute the fund portfolio return as the equal-weighted average
return of all funds in the corresponding portfolio over the next month. Subsequently, we
compute the abnormal returns using the time-series of fund portfolio returns. We analyze the
12future performance of funds after computing the risk shifting measure to avoid any potential
issues of reverse causality.
We report four di®erent performance measures for the fund portfolios. To adjust for risk
and style e®ects, abnormal returns are computed using the one-factor CAPM, the Fama and
French (1993), the Carhart (1997), and the Ferson and Schadt (1996) models. The Fama-
French-Carhart model is speci¯ed as follows:
RFk;t ¡ RTB;t = ®k + ¯
M
k (RM;t ¡ RTB;t) + ¯
SMB
k (RS;t ¡ RB;t)
+¯
HML
k (RH;t ¡ RL;t) + ¯
UMD
k (RU;t ¡ RD;t) + ²k;t: (5)
The return of portfolio k during time period t is denoted by RFk;t. The index M corre-
sponds to the market portfolio and the index TB to the risk-free Treasury bill rate. Portfolios
of small and large stocks are denoted by S and B; portfolios of stocks with high and low ratios
between their book values and their market values are denoted by H and L; and portfolios
of stocks with relatively high and low returns during the previous year are denoted by U and
D. The Fama-French-Carhart model nests the CAPM model (which includes only the market
factor) and the Fama-French model (which includes the size and the book-to-market factors
in addition to the market factor).
Following Wermers (2003), we use the Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditional model that
nests the Carhart model.
RFk;t ¡ RTB;t = ®k + ¯
M
k (RM;t ¡ RTB;t) + ¯
SMB
k (RS;t ¡ RB;t) + ¯
HML
k (RH;t ¡ RL;t)
+ ¯
UMD





k(RM;t ¡ RTB;t) £ MACRO
j
t¡1 + ²k;t; (6)
where MACRO
j
t¡1 denotes one of ¯ve demeaned lagged macro-economic variables including
the Treasury bill yield, the dividend yield of the S&P Composite Index, the Treasury yield
spread (long- minus short-term bonds), the quality spread in the corporate bond market (low-
minus high-grade bonds), and an indicator variable for the month of January.8 In all four
8The market, size, book-to-market, momentum factors and the risk-free rate are obtained from Ken French's
13models, the factor loadings ¯k denote the sensitivities of the returns of portfolio k to the
various factors and are estimated for each of the portfolios separately. The intercepts ®k
capture the abnormal returns of the corresponding models and are reported in Table 4.9
Table 4 reports the performance of mutual fund portfolios sorted by their risk shifting.
We observe that funds that increase risk experience signi¯cantly worse subsequent abnormal
returns than funds with stable risk levels. Funds that reduce risk also experience relatively
poor performance, although not signi¯cantly di®erent from funds with stable risk levels. For
example, funds that increase risk the most (in Portfolio 5) exhibit an abnormal return of
-22 basis points per month using the Carhart model; funds that decrease risk the most (in
Portfolio 1) exhibit a Carhart alpha of -7 basis points per month; and funds with the most
consistent risk levels (in Portfolio 3) have an abnormal return of -6 basis points per month. The
poor performance of funds that increase risk remains economically and statistically signi¯cant
using alternative factor models. Figure 2 illustrates these results graphically.
In unreported results, we ¯nd that the performance results become substantially stronger
if we subdivide Portfolio 5 into more extreme portfolios. For example, the abnormal return
of mutual funds that increase their risk levels by more than 5% (corresponding to 3.8% of the
mutual fund observations) amounts to -31 basis points per month using the Carhart model,
and ranges between -25 and -46 basis points per month using the other factor models.
The asymmetry between the performance of funds that increase and decrease risk is con-
sistent with the ¯nding in Table 2 that increasing risk is driven by the high current holdings
volatility and is more of an active choice by funds while decreasing risk is driven by high past
realized volatility and is more of a passive reversion back to the long-term mean. Increases
in risk levels can be achieved by shifting towards riskier securities and by concentrating the
website (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). The dividend yield of the
S&P Composite Index is obtained from Shiller's website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/data.htm).
The Treasury and corporate bond yields are obtained from the Federal Reserve Board
(http://www.federalreserve.gov).
9Using a ¯ve factor model including the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor does not a®ect the
results qualitatively and quantitatively. In addition, our results are also consistent if we use the manipulation-
proof performance measure of Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel, and Welch (2007).
14portfolio on fewer securities and fewer sectors as documented in Table 3. On the other hand,
decreases in risk levels can be achieved by holding a more balanced and better diversi¯ed
portfolio.
Table 5 summarizes the long-term impact of risk shifting. We form mutual fund portfolios
using longer-term lags and report the Carhart alphas of mutual fund portfolios formed based
on lagged RS measures. The ¯rst column repeats the performance results from Table 4,
which use the RS measure in the prior quarter to form portfolios. The remaining columns
form portfolios based on the lagged RS measures up to four quarters earlier. The poor
performance of Portfolio 5 remains statistically signi¯cant over the ¯rst four quarters after
the portfolio formation.
These performance results build on an extensive literature that investigates the investment
ability of mutual fund managers. Whereas the recent mutual fund literature ¯nds that some
mutual fund managers have signi¯cant stock selection ability, our paper indicates that risk
shifting does not improve fund performance.10 Instead, consistent with the the timing litera-
ture, we do not ¯nd that mutual funds bene¯t signi¯cantly by taking advantage of time-varying
investment opportunities.11
6 Motivation for Risk Shifting
The poor performance of risk shifters suggests that risk shifting behavior is either an indication
of inferior ability or is motivated by agency problems in delegated portfolio management. To
investigate the potential role of agency problems in risk shifting behavior, we conduct two
10See, for example, Grinblatt and Titman (1993), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Ferson and Schadt (1996),
Carhart (1997), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), Wermers (2000), Baks, Metrick, and Wachter
(2001), Bollen and Busse (2001), Coval and Moskowitz (2001), Chen, Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), Cohen,
Coval, and Pastor (2005), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2006), Kosowski,
Timmermann, Wermers, and White (2006), Kacperczyk and Seru (2007), Mamaysky, Spiegel, and Zhang
(2007), Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2008), Cohen, Polk, and Silli (2008), Cremers and Petajisto (2008),
Da, Gao, and Jagannathan (2008), Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008), Yuan (2008), Christo®ersen and
Sarkissian (2009), and Brown, Harlow, and Zhang (2009).
11See, for example, Treynor and Mazuy (1966), Henriksson and Merton (1981), Busse (1999), Jiang (2003),
Jiang, Yao, and Yu (2007), and Breon-Drish and Sagi (2008).
15additional analyses in this section. First, we study the potential bene¯ts of risk shifting by
comparing the return distribution of funds that shift risk with funds that follow more stable
risk levels. Second, we ask whether funds that bene¯t more from risk shifting are more likely
to shift risk and whether these funds experience worse performance when they shift risk.
6.1 Return Distribution of Risk Shifters
Mutual fund investors tend to invest in funds with stellar performance and do not penalize
poor performance equivalently, resulting in a convex °ow-performance relation. The mutual
fund literature extensively documents this pattern and suggests that fund managers have an
incentive to shift risk levels to increase the probability of becoming a top-ranked mutual fund.
To verify whether risk shifters are more likely to have extreme future performance, we
report in Figure 3 the cumulative distribution functions of the performance ranking of mutual
funds in di®erent risk shifting groups. At the end of each quarter, we ¯rst compute the
percentile ranks for all the funds in our sample. The percentile ranks are based on the
Carhart alphas over the subsequent 12-month period. In a second step, we sort mutual funds
into the same ¯ve portfolios as reported in Table 2. Finally, we compute the cumulative
distribution function of the performance ranks for each of the ¯ve portfolios. The ¯gure
shows the cumulative distributions for three di®erent groups of mutual funds. The curve RS1
corresponds to funds in Portfolio 1 that reduce risk the most, RS5 to funds in Portfolio 5 that
increase risk the most, and RS3 to funds in Portfolio 3 that maintain stable risk levels. The
intermediate groups RS2 and RS4 are not depicted separately, but fall between the middle
and extreme groups.
Funds that increase risk exhibit signi¯cantly higher volatility and are more likely to be
ranked in the extreme of the mutual fund distribution than funds with more stable risk
exposures. For example, 15.2% of mutual funds in the RS5 group and only 8.7% of mutual
funds in the RS3 group rank in the top decile. Furthermore, 1.8% of funds in the RS5
group and only 0.6% of funds in the RS3 group rank in the top percentile of all funds. Not
16surprisingly, risk shifting also increases the probability of being ranked at the bottom of the
performance distribution. For example, around 17.7% of mutual funds in the RS5 group and
just 7.1% of mutual funds in the RS3 group rank in the bottom decile. The more striking
di®erence at the bottom decile than at the top decile is the source of the lower average
performance of the RS5 group. Yet, funds might prefer the return distribution of the RS5
group because it enables them to take advantage of the convex °ow-performance relation.
6.2 Di®erential Bene¯ts of Risk Shifting
We investigate whether the propensity to shift risk and the performance consequences of risk
shifting di®er across funds with di®erent incentives to shift risk. The incentives of risk shifting
are higher for funds that are better able to reap the bene¯ts of extreme performance. Since the
expected pro¯t for mutual funds increases with both the expense ratio and the assets under
management, we expect the bene¯ts of risk shifting to be higher both for funds with higher
expense ratios and for funds with a more sensitive °ow-performance relation. The mutual
fund literature has identi¯ed younger, smaller funds, and funds that belong to smaller fund
families as having a more sensitive °ow-performance relation. Hence, we consider di®erent
subgroups of funds based on these four characteristics: the expense ratio, fund age, fund size,
and the size of the fund family.
For each characteristic we divide mutual funds in each period into two groups depending
on whether the fund characteristic is above or below the median value. In a second step, we
further divide the two groups of funds into ¯ve portfolios according to their most recent risk
shifting measure. The ¯rst group of columns in Table 6 summarizes the frequency distribution
of funds across the two groups and the last group of columns reports the subsequent Carhart
alphas for the ten mutual fund portfolios.12
We ¯nd that funds with larger bene¯ts of risk shifting are more likely to shift risk and
perform particularly poorly after shifting risk. For example, in Panel A of Table 6, of the
12The frequencies are computed on a quarterly basis and the di®erences in the frequencies use Newey-West
standard errors with a lag length of four quarters. The Carhart alphas are computed as described in Section 5.
1750% of mutual funds that charge above-median expense ratios, 7.36% belong to Portfolio 5
(that decrease risk the most), whereas only 5.27% of funds charging below-median expense
ratios belong to Portfolio 5. In addition, high-expense funds in Portfolio 5 exhibit a Carhart
alpha of -24 basis points per month, which is statistically signi¯cant at the 1% level, whereas
low-expense funds in Portfolio 5 have an insigni¯cant alpha of -10 basis points per month.
The row \All" reports the average subsequent performance of high and low expense funds
across the ¯ve risk shifting groups. In contrast to the drastic performance di®erence be-
tween these two groups of funds in Portfolio 5, the average high-expense funds underperform
low-expense funds by only 3 basis points per month. This performance di®erence, which
is calculated after expenses, is lower than the di®erence in expense ratios between these two
groups (which amounts to 5 basis points per month). Thus, high-expense funds do not exhibit
inferior investor ability before deducting expenses. Yet, high-expense funds that increase their
risk levels experience very poor subsequent performance, consistent with the notion that these
funds opportunistically shift risk to take advantage of the convex °ow-performance relation.
Our result is also consistent with Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009), who ¯nd that high-expense
funds do not perform better than low-expense funds, even before expense. They interpret this
evidence as an agency problem in which high-expense funds target naive investors who are
not responsive to expenses.
Chevalier and Ellison (1997) ¯nd that young funds with less established track records have
larger incentives to shift risk since the °ow sensitivity to performance is more pronounced for
young funds. They also ¯nd smaller funds have more sensitive fund °ows. In addition, Huang,
Wei, and Yan (2007) ¯nd that funds in smaller fund families have higher °ow-performance
sensitivity. Hence, these funds have more signi¯cant incentives to shift risk.
Panels B, C and D of Table 6 con¯rm that young, small funds, and funds a±liated with
relatively small families are more likely to shift risk and they experience particularly poor ab-
normal returns if they increase their risk levels. Since the average performance of funds sorted
by each of these characteristics is similar across the high and low groups, these characteristics
18are not signi¯cantly related to investment ability. The fact that they are all related to the
potential bene¯ts of risk shifting provides supportive evidence that agency problems, rather
than ability, are the likely cause of risk shifting behavior.
7 Sources for the Poor Performance of Risk Shifters
In this section, we study the sources for the poor performance of funds that increase their risk
level. Mutual funds can change the riskiness of their portfolios by changing the composition
between equity holdings and cash holdings, by changing their exposure to systematic risks
within their equity portfolios, and by changing their idiosyncratic risk exposures. We construct
alternative RS measures based on these various mechanisms of risk shifting and investigate
the performance consequences of risk shifting using each alternative measure. This analysis
sheds light on the sources of the poor performance of risk shifters. We also consider several
alternative explanations for the poor performance of risk shifters, for example, the additional
trading costs to implement risk shifting strategies or to accommodate fund °ows, and the role
of past fund performance and volatility.
7.1 Cash and Equity Holdings
Table 7 reports the performance consequences of risk shifting based on six alternative RS
measures. The ¯rst column reports the Carhart alphas for fund portfolios formed according
to our base case RS measure which is computed using the complete holdings of the fund. The
results correspond to the results in Table 4 using the Carhart risk and style adjustments.
The second column focuses on the aggregate proportion invested in cash and other non-
equity positions and ignores the riskiness of the equity positions. This cash-based measure of









f;t is the most recently disclosed proportion invested in cash and other non-equity
securities according to the CRSP mutual fund database and wcash
f;t is the average proportion
19invested in non-equity securities over the prior 36 months. Other non-equity positions include
bonds, preferred stocks, and other securities, and are only 2.46% of fund assets. To be
consistent with the other RS measures in which a higher RS measure corresponds to a riskier
current position relative to the past, we multiply the di®erence by minus one. The portfolios
are formed using the RScash measure in speci¯c ranges to maintain a similar distribution
of funds in the ¯ve groups as in our base case. Portfolio 1 (5) includes funds that increase
(decrease) the proportion invested in cash by more than 7.5% and Portfolio 3 includes funds
that change their cash proportion by less than 2.5%.
The third column considers only the riskiness of the disclosed equity positions and ignores










f;t is the current holdings volatility estimated using the returns of the most recently
disclosed equity positions and ¾
R;equity
f;t is the realized holdings volatility estimated using the
returns of a hypothetical portfolio that maintains the historically disclosed equity positions,
updated whenever new holdings become available, over the prior 36 months. Portfolio 1
(5) includes funds that decrease (increase) their equity risk by more than 2% per year and
Portfolio 3 includes funds that change their equity risk by less than 1%.
The results from Table 7 indicate that funds that increase risk have poor subsequent
performance, whether they decrease the proportion invested in cash or increase the volatility of
their equity holdings. The impact of increasing the volatility of equity holdings is similar to the
base case result using all the holdings (with a performance di®erence of about 17 basis points
per month), while the performance consequence of reducing cash holdings is substantially
lower (at 6 basis points per month). Therefore, increasing the volatility of equity holdings is
more costly in terms of their subsequent performance. In addition, the weaker result using
cash holdings suggests that activities that mainly a®ect the fraction of cash holdings (for
example, fund °ows and fund managers's e®ort to time the aggregate market) have a smaller
impact on fund performance.
207.2 Systematic and Idiosyncratic Risk
Fund managers might shift risk in an e®ort to take advantage of time-varying investment
opportunities. They might change their exposure to systematic risk if they believe that they
have superior market timing abilities; or they might change the idiosyncratic risk of their
portfolio in order to utilize their (perceived) stock selection ability.
The last three columns of Table 7 compare the future abnormal performance of fund
portfolios sorted by systematic and idiosyncratic risk levels. The fourth column is based on









f;t is the CAPM beta of the most recently disclosed holdings and ¯R
f;t is the CAPM
beta of the realized returns over the prior 36 months. Portfolio 1 (5) includes funds that
decrease (increase) their CAPM beta by more than 0.15 and Portfolio 3 includes funds that
change their betas by less than 0.05.
The ¯nal two risk shifting measures in Table 7 are based on the idiosyncratic volatilities
computed using the CAPM and the Carhart factor models. The idiosyncratic risk shifting










f;t is the idiosyncratic volatility of the most recently disclosed fund holdings
return and ¾
R;idiosync
f;t is the idiosyncratic volatility of the past realized fund return. The
idiosyncratic volatilities are computed as the standard deviations of the residuals from the
CAPM or the Carhart factor regressions over the prior 36 months. Portfolio 1 (5) includes
funds that decrease (increase) their idiosyncratic risk by more than 2% per year and Portfolio 3
includes funds that change their idiosyncratic risk by less than 1%.
We ¯nd a strong relation between risk shifting and fund performance for portfolios sorted
according to changes in idiosyncratic volatilities, but do not ¯nd a statistically signi¯cant
return pattern for portfolios sorted according to changes in systematic risk. For example,
21the performance di®erence between funds that increase their idiosyncratic risk the most (in
Portfolio 5) and funds that maintain stable risk levels (in Portfolio 3) is between -18 and -21
basis points per month, both signi¯cant at the 5% level, depending on whether idiosyncratic
risk is measured relative to the market model or the four-factor Carhart model. On the
other hand, the performance di®erence between funds that increase their systematic risk the
most and funds that maintain stable systematic risk is -5 basis points per month and is not
statistically signi¯cant. Thus, the poor performance of funds that increase risk is driven by
the increase in their idiosyncratic risk levels and not by the increase in their systematic risk
exposure. Our results suggest that the main driver of the poor performance of risk shifters
is not their inability to time the aggregate market movements but their tendency to take on
idiosyncratic risk.13
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Basak, Pavlova, and Shapiro (2007), and Chen and Pen-
nacchi (2009) suggest that, if fund managers are evaluated on their performance relative to
a benchmark, they have an incentive to increase tracking error volatility. Our ¯nding that
some fund managers signi¯cantly increase their idiosyncratic volatility is consistent with these
predictions.
7.3 Trading Costs
One potential source of the poor performance of funds that increase risk could be the signi¯cant
trading costs incurred by such funds. Since we analyze only the future performance of funds
after computing the risk shifting measure, our performance measures are not contaminated
by the direct trading costs to implement the current risk shifting strategy. However, since risk
shifting is persistent, these funds might also have higher trading costs in the future.
We use turnover as a proxy for trading costs since it captures the majority of trading costs
as described by Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec (1999). If trading costs are the main cause
13Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) report that stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility based on daily
returns tend to exhibit relatively poor abnormal returns in the subsequent month. To investigate whether this
e®ect can explain our results, we augment, in unreported results, the Fama-French-Carhart factor model by
an idiosyncratic volatility factor. Adjusting for the idiosyncratic volatility factor does not qualitatively change
our main result that funds that increase their risk the most experience the worst subsequent performance.
22of the poor performance of risk shifters, then we should observe that the relation between
performance and risk shifting is particularly pronounced for high turnover funds. We sort funds
into subgroups with di®erent turnover and risk shifting measures, following the procedure in
Section 6.2, and report the frequency distribution and the Carhart alphas in Panel A of
Table 8. Surprisingly, we ¯nd that increasing risk has worse performance consequences for
funds with low turnover than for funds with high turnover. For example, the performance
di®erence between Portfolios 5 and 3 is -25 basis points per month for funds with low turnover
and only -8 basis points for funds with high turnover. Thus, direct trading costs are unlikely
the main reason behind the poor performance of risk shifters.
Another proxy for trading costs is fund °ows. Edelen (1999) documents that the extra
trading and the resulting price impact induced by fund °ows can signi¯cantly reduce the
average performance of mutual funds. In addition, Coval and Sta®ord (2007), Chen, Hanson,
Hong, and Stein (2007), and Zhang (2008) show that distressed mutual funds experiencing
large money out°ows are forced to liquidate their positions in \¯re sales." Such out°ows
can increase the total risk level of mutual funds as they reduce their cash positions or as
they reduce their portfolio diversi¯cation by selling some of their positions. To examine the
impact of fund °ows, we divide mutual funds into groups depending on whether their fund
°ows in the prior year are below or above the median level. Panel B shows that there are no
signi¯cant di®erences in the propensities to shift risk for funds in these two groups, suggesting
that most funds are able to undo the e®ect of funds °ows and reach their desired risk level.
In addition, although funds with below-median °ows perform slightly worse than funds with
above-median °ows when they increase risk, the performance di®erence is not signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero.
Therefore, the poor performance of funds that increase risk is unlikely driven by the
additional transaction costs needed to implement the risk shifting strategy or to accommodate
fund °ows.
237.4 Past Fund Performance and Volatility
The past fund performance and volatility level may reveal the ability and incentives of fund
managers. Mutual funds with worse prior performance are likely to have inferior ability and
might continue to perform poorly. The literature suggests that past winners and losers have
di®erent incentives to take risk. In addition, funds with higher volatility levels have more
extreme performance and might be able to take advantage of the convex °ow-performance
relation without shifting risk. It is therefore important to study the impact of past fund
performance and realized volatility.
Panel C of Table 8 sorts mutual funds by their prior year performance and the risk shifting
measure. We ¯nd that funds with relatively disappointing performance are relatively more
likely to shift risk down (in Portfolio 1), whereas funds with superior performance are more
likely to shift risk up (in Portfolio 5). To investigate the relation between prior performance
and risk shifting in more detail, we analyze in unreported results the economic determinants of
risk shifting using a multivariate regression analysis. We ¯nd that both funds with very poor
and with very high past performance increase risk above their prior realized risk levels. This
result is consistent with Hu, Kale, Pagani, and Subramanian (2008), who develop a uni¯ed
theory that generates a U-shape relation between risk choices and prior performance. They
¯nd evidence that managers that signi¯cantly outperform or underperform the benchmark
exhibit higher subsequent risk levels. The asymmetry in the frequency distribution in Panel C
occurs because the incentive to shift risk is on average more pronounced for winner funds than
for loser funds.
The performance consequences of risk shifting are stronger for loser funds than for winner
funds. Within loser funds, we ¯nd that funds that increase risk the most underperform
funds that maintain stable risk levels by 16 basis points per month. On the other hand,
the corresponding performance di®erence for winner funds is only 7 basis points and is not
statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Panel D of Table 8 reports the results for funds sorted on past realized volatility and risk
24shifting measures. While it is intuitive that funds with higher risk levels are much more likely
to shift risk down, it is rather surprising that they are also more likely to increase risk further.
Moreover, these high-risk funds that increase risk further su®er the worst future performance,
with a Carhart alpha that is -27 basis points lower than the high-risk funds that maintain
stable risk levels. In contrast, low-risk funds have similar performance across risk shifting
groups, with a performance di®erence of only -1 basis point between Portfolios 5 and 3. The
di®erent impact of risk shifting for the high- and low-volatility groups is striking, especially
given their similar average performance.
In summary, mutual funds with worse prior performance are likely to have inferior ability.
These funds also perform particularly poorly when they increase risk. We also ¯nd that past
realized volatility is not directly related to future risk-adjusted performance but is critical for
the impact of risk shifting behavior. Low-risk funds do not su®er poor performance when
they increase risk while high-risk funds have signi¯cantly lower future performance when they
choose to increase risk further.
8 Multivariate Regression
This section uses a multivariate regression analysis to investigate the relation between risk
shifting and subsequent fund performance. This methodology allows us to control for addi-
tional fund characteristics. We run the following Fama-MacBeth speci¯cation:





The dependent variable in each cross-section is a performance measure of an individual
mutual fund PERF in a particular month. To capture the non-monotonic impact of risk
shifting on performance, we split RS into two components depending on whether it is positive
or negative. The coe±cient ¯1 captures the relation between risk shifting and returns when
25RS is positive and ¯2 captures the relation between risk shifting and returns when RS is
negative. The additional control variables are the realized volatility over the prior 36 months
¾R, the prior-year return of a fund RFf;t¡1, the age of the fund de¯ned as the logarithm of
(1 + AGE), the logarithm of the assets under management LOGTNA, the expense ratio of
the fund EXP, the turnover ratio TO, and the fund °ow over the prior year FLOW. All
control variables are lagged by at least one month. In a ¯rst step, we run in each month
a cross-sectional regression. In a second step, we compute the means of the cross-sectional
coe±cients over the whole time period between 1983 and 2006.
One commonly used methodology to adjust for risk and style in the mutual fund literature
is to ¯rst estimate the factor loadings for each fund over a rolling window using prior data
and then compute abnormal returns in the subsequent period as the di®erence between the
actual fund return and the expected fund return based on the estimated factor loadings. This
methodology is not appropriate in our context since we focus on the risk shifting behavior of
funds over time. The factor loadings estimated over prior windows might not be accurate for
funds that shift risk levels signi¯cantly.14 Instead, the risk adjustments for our performance
measures are based on the most recent portfolio holdings.
We use four di®erent performance measures: (1) the raw fund return; (2) the Carhart
abnormal return; (3) the characteristics-adjusted return; and (4) the return gap. The Carhart
alpha of a fund is de¯ned in a similar way to the bottom-up alphas of Elton, Gruber, and
Blake (2007) as the fund return minus the expected factor return:
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The expected factor return is computed as the product of the betas of the most recent
holdings of the fund and the returns of the four Carhart factors. The betas of the most
14Despite this concern, the results are not substantially di®erent if we use fund-speci¯c abnormal returns as
dependent variables. This is consistent with the prior portfolio results which indicate that the performance
results are not very sensitive to alternative factor adjustments.
26recent holdings are obtained by regressing the hypothetical return of the most recent portfolio
holdings (including non-equity positions) over the last 36 months on the Carhart factors.
The characteristics-adjusted return is de¯ned as the di®erence between the fund return
and the benchmark return of securities with similar risk and style characteristics:
®
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The weight invested in position i at the beginning of month t in the mutual fund f is
denoted by wi
f;t and the benchmark return to which position i was allocated during month
t ¡ k is denoted by BRi(t¡k);t. For equity positions, we follow Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman,
and Wermers (1997) and de¯ne the return on a benchmark portfolio as the value-weighed
return of stocks that fall in the identical size, value, and momentum quintiles as the equity
holdings of a fund. For non-equity positions we set the benchmark returns equal to the returns
corresponding to the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Bond Index (for bonds and preferred stocks)
and to the Treasury bill rate (for cash and other securities).
Finally, the return gap is computed following Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2008) as the
residual that captures the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns:
RGf;t = RFf;t ¡ RHf;t + EXPf;t; (14)
where the investor return is denoted by RF, the holdings return by RH, and the expense
ratio by EXP.
Table 9 reports the multivariate regression estimates. All speci¯cations indicate a sig-
ni¯cantly negative relation between risk shifting and the various performance measures for
funds that increase risk and a generally insigni¯cant relation for funds that decrease risk. The
performance consequences of increasing risk are similar in magnitude to the results reported
in Table 4. For example, the ¯rst column indicates that an increase in RS from 0 to 5% (cor-
responding roughly to the di®erence in risk shifting between portfolios 3 and 5 in Table 2),
reduces the raw fund return by 22 basis points per month. The impact of increasing risk by
27¯ve percentage points ranges between 8 basis points for the return gap and 30 basis points
for the four-factor adjusted fund return.
Including additional control variables does not have a signi¯cant impact on the risk shift-
ing coe±cients. The level of the realized volatility over the prior 36 months does not have a
signi¯cant explanatory power for fund performance, consistent with the evidence in Panel D
of Table 8. The positive coe±cient on the lagged return indicates some performance persis-
tence. The coe±cient on the expense ratio is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in the ¯rst three
speci¯cations which use an after-expense performance measure. On the other hand the ex-
pense ratio has no signi¯cant relation to the return gap, which is measured after adjusting for
fund expenses. Finally, funds with higher turnover tend to exhibit slightly higher performance
using all four performance measures.
The results in this section con¯rm the portfolio results reported in Table 4 that funds that
increase risk perform poorly in the future, even after adjusting for other fund characteristics
and after controlling for risk and style.
9 Conclusions
As more and more investors delegate their portfolio decisions to mutual fund managers, po-
tential agency problems between fund managers and investors have become increasingly im-
portant. Our paper extends the literature on one particular agency problem { the incentive for
fund managers to shift the risk level of their portfolios to increase their personal compensation
{ and investigates its consequences for fund investors.
Risk shifting per se does not necessarily hurt fund investors. As long as the act of risk
shifting is well-known and has no performance consequences, investors can form e±cient port-
folios by adjusting their allocation to the funds based on the expected ability and risk levels.
However, if investors are not fully aware of the risk shifting behavior or if the changing risk
level hampers their ability to assess fund performance, then individual portfolios are less likely
to be e±cient.
28We ¯nd that even if investors are fully aware of the risk shifting behavior, they are better
o® avoiding funds that are prone to switch risk over time. The reason is that funds that shift
risk perform worse than funds that keep stable risk levels over time. In addition, funds with
larger incentives to shift risk are more likely to increase risk and perform particularly poorly
after increasing risk. These results are consistent with risk shifting being a consequence of op-
portunistic behavior of fund managers and inconsistent with risk shifting being a consequence
of skilled fund managers taking advantage of time-varying investment opportunities.
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33Table 1: Summary Statistics
This table summarizes the characteristics of the mutual funds in our sample over the period between
1980 and 2006.
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Median
Total Net Assets (TNA) (in Millions) 1,382.54 4,739.35 277.84
Age (in Years) 17.54 15.29 12.00
Expense Ratio (in %) 1.28 0.46 1.24
Turnover Ratio (in %) 90.65 112.98 66.00
Common Stock Proportion (in %) 91.28 12.04 95.00
Cash Proportion (in %) 6.26 9.04 3.78
Bond Proportion (in %) 1.58 6.49 0.00
Preferred Stock Proportion (in %) 0.39 2.57 0.00
Other Securities Proportion (in %) 0.49 3.81 0.00
Flow (in % per Month) 0.43 5.04 -0.36
Investor Return (in % per Month) 0.83 5.34 1.07
Holdings Return (in % per Month) 0.91 5.21 1.10
Number of Stock Positions 89.23 130.77 62.00
Industry Concentration Index 0.12 0.20 0.05
Size Score 4.20 0.85 4.53
Value Score 2.80 0.46 2.79
Momentum Score 3.10 0.59 3.07
Current Holdings Volatility (in % per Year) 17.54 7.62 16.41
Past Realized Volatility (in % per Year) 17.86 7.93 16.42
Risk Shifting (in % per Year) -0.33 4.58 0.01
Total number of funds 2,335








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8Table 3: Mechanisms of Risk Shifting.
This table summarizes the initial levels (Panel A) and the changes (Panel B) in the fund characteris-
tics that determine the total risk of a fund. The initial levels correspond to the average characteristics
over the prior 36 months and the changes correspond to the di®erence between the most recent char-
acteristics and the average characteristics over the prior 36 months according to the most recent risk
shifting measure. Portfolios 1 to 5 are de¯ned in Table 2 with cuto® RS measures of f§1%;§2:5%g.
Panel A: Initial Fund Characteristics
RS Cash Market Idiosyn. Size Value Momen. Number Industry
Portfolio Holdings Beta Volatility Score Score Score of Stocks Concen.
1 0:12 1:11 3:42 3:89 2:72 3:34 72:50 0:17
2 0:10 1:00 2:29 4:06 2:80 3:20 80:26 0:13
3 0:08 0:93 2:00 4:21 2:89 3:10 89:45 0:11
4 0:09 0:94 2:18 4:02 2:87 3:14 81:31 0:12
5 0:10 0:96 2:84 3:82 2:81 3:23 62:18 0:17
Panel B: Changes in Fund Characteristics
RS Cash Market Idiosyn. Size Value Momen. Number Industry
Portfolio Holdings Beta Volatility Score Score Score of Stocks Concen.
1 0:05 ¡0:25 ¡1:02 0:10 0:06 ¡0:11 3:20 ¡0:01
2 0:01 ¡0:10 ¡0:17 0:06 0:00 ¡0:03 3:98 0:00
3 ¡0:01 ¡0:01 0:05 0:03 ¡0:02 ¡0:01 3:58 0:00
4 ¡0:03 0:08 0:26 0:02 ¡0:01 0:01 1:50 0:00
5 ¡0:05 0:22 0:82 ¡0:05 ¡0:03 0:04 ¡1:59 0:01Table 4: Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting
This table reports the abnormal monthly returns of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according to the
most recent risk shifting measure. The table summarizes the intercepts from factor regressions based
on the CAPM, Fama-French, Carhart, and Ferson-Schadt models. All returns are expressed in %
per month. Portfolios 1 to 5 are de¯ned in Table 2 with cuto® RS measures of f§1%;§2:5%g. The
signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance
at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
RS CAPM Fama- Carhart Ferson-
Portfolio French Schadt
1 ¡0:12 ¡0:10 ¡0:07 ¡0:09
(0:09) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
2 ¡0:02 ¡0:05 ¡0:04 ¡0:08
(0:05) (0:05) (0:05) (0:05)
3 0:01 ¡0:07 ¡0:06 ¡0:09¤¤
(0:05) (0:05) (0:05) (0:05)
4 ¡0:03 ¡0:08 ¡0:09 ¡0:13¤¤
(0:06) (0:06) (0:06) (0:06)
5 ¡0:22¤¤ ¡0:14¤ ¡0:22¤¤¤ ¡0:21¤¤¤
(0:11) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
(1)-(3) ¡0:14 ¡0:03 ¡0:01 0:00
(0:09) (0:07) (0:08) (0:07)
(5)-(3) ¡0:23¤¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:16¤¤ ¡0:12¤
(0:10) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)Table 5: Longer-Term Performance Consequences of Risk Shifting
This table reports Carhart-adjusted monthly returns of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according
to the prior risk shifting measure. The performance of the fund portfolios is computed based on
the risk shifting measures of funds over the prior four quarters. All returns are expressed in % per
month. Portfolios 1 to 5 are de¯ned in Table 2 with cuto® RS measures of f§1%;§2:5%g. The
signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance
at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
RS Number of Lags in Quarters
Portfolio 1 2 3 4
1 ¡0:07 ¡0:02 ¡0:03 ¡0:08
(0:08) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
2 ¡0:04 ¡0:05 ¡0:04 ¡0:01
(0:05) (0:06) (0:05) (0:05)
3 ¡0:06 ¡0:06 ¡0:07 ¡0:06
(0:05) (0:05) (0:05) (0:04)
4 ¡0:09 ¡0:08 ¡0:03 ¡0:07
(0:06) (0:06) (0:05) (0:05)
5 ¡0:22¤¤¤ ¡0:21¤¤¤ ¡0:22¤¤¤ ¡0:18¤¤
(0:08) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
(1)-(3) ¡0:01 0:04 0:04 ¡0:02
(0:08) (0:08) (0:07) (0:07)
(5)-(3) ¡0:16¤¤ ¡0:16¤¤ ¡0:15¤¤ ¡0:11
(0:07) (0:07) (0:07) (0:07)Table 6: Performance of Funds with Di®erent Risk Shifting Incentives
This table reports the frequency distribution and the future Carhart alphas of portfolios of mutual
funds sorted according to risk shifting and fund characteristics that are related to risk shifting
incentives (expense ratio, age, size, and fund family size). Mutual funds are ¯rst sorted into two
equal-sized groups according to whether the characteristic is above or below its median value. In a
second step, funds are further divided into ¯ve groups according to their risk shifting level. The table
reports the average proportion of funds that fall into one of the ten groups and the Carhart alphas
of the ten portfolios and the di®erences in the future Carhart alphas between selected portfolios.
All returns are expressed in % per month. Portfolios 1 to 5 are de¯ned in Table 2 with cuto® RS
measures of f§1%;§2:5%g. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and
three asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Funds Sorted by Expense Ratio
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Low Exp. High Exp. L¡H Low Exp. High Exp. L¡H
1 5:92 8:28 ¡2:36¤¤¤ ¡0:10 ¡0:07 ¡0:03
(0:24) (0:10) (0:10) (0:12)
2 7:29 8:07 ¡0:78¤ ¡0:03 ¡0:06 0:03
(0:42) (0:06) (0:06) (0:04)
3 22:71 18:63 4:09¤¤¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:05 ¡0:02
(0:57) (0:05) (0:05) (0:02)
4 8:64 7:82 0:82¤ ¡0:05 ¡0:12¤ 0:07
(0:42) (0:06) (0:07) (0:04)
5 5:27 7:36 ¡2:09¤¤¤ ¡0:10 ¡0:24¤¤¤ 0:14¤¤
(0:36) (0:07) (0:08) (0:06)
All ¡0:07¤ ¡0:10¤¤ 0:03¤
(0:04) (0:04) (0:02)
(1)-(3) ¡0:03 ¡0:02 ¡0:01
(0:10) (0:10) (0:12)
(5)-(3) ¡0:02 ¡0:19¤¤¤ 0:17¤¤
(0:06) (0:07) (0:07)
Panel B: Funds Sorted by Fund Age
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Young Old Y¡O Young Old Y¡O
1 7:59 6:62 0:97¤¤¤ ¡0:09 ¡0:07 ¡0:01
(0:27) (0:08) (0:11) (0:10)
2 7:82 7:54 0:27 ¡0:08 ¡0:04 ¡0:04
(0:26) (0:06) (0:06) (0:04)
3 19:06 22:28 ¡3:23¤¤¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:07 0:00
(0:54) (0:05) (0:05) (0:03)
4 8:49 7:97 0:53 ¡0:08 ¡0:10¤ 0:02
(0:47) (0:06) (0:06) (0:04)
5 6:95 5:68 1:26¤¤¤ ¡0:21¤¤¤ ¡0:13¤ ¡0:08
(0:39) (0:07) (0:07) (0:06)
All ¡0:09¤¤ ¡0:08¤¤ ¡0:01
(0:04) (0:04) (0:02)
(1)-(3) ¡0:03 ¡0:01 ¡0:02
(0:08) (0:11) (0:10)
(5)-(3) ¡0:15¤¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:09
(0:07) (0:06) (0:07)Panel C: Funds Sorted by Fund Size
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Small Large S¡L Small Large S¡L
1 7:81 6:40 1:41¤¤¤ ¡0:11 0:01 ¡0:11
(0:37) (0:10) (0:14) (0:16)
2 8:07 7:30 0:77¤¤ ¡0:03 ¡0:09 0:05
(0:34) (0:06) (0:06) (0:05)
3 19:49 21:85 ¡2:36¤¤¤ ¡0:03 ¡0:09¤ 0:05¤
(0:36) (0:05) (0:05) (0:03)
4 7:87 8:58 ¡0:71¤ ¡0:10 ¡0:09 ¡0:01
(0:36) (0:06) (0:06) (0:05)
5 6:70 5:93 0:78¤¤¤ ¡0:25¤¤¤ ¡0:08 ¡0:17¤¤
(0:29) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
All ¡0:08¤¤ ¡0:08¤¤ 0:00
(0:04) (0:04) (0:02)
(1)-(3) ¡0:07 0:09 ¡0:17
(0:10) (0:14) (0:16)
(5)-(3) ¡0:21¤¤¤ 0:00 ¡0:22¤¤
(0:07) (0:08) (0:09)
Panel D: Funds Sorted by Family Size
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Small Large S¡L Small Large S¡L
1 7:33 6:84 0:49 ¡0:11 ¡0:03 ¡0:08
(0:30) (0:09) (0:10) (0:09)
2 7:70 7:67 0:04 ¡0:10¤ ¡0:00 ¡0:09¤¤
(0:42) (0:05) (0:06) (0:04)
3 20:07 21:24 ¡1:16¤¤¤ ¡0:05 ¡0:07 0:02
(0:40) (0:05) (0:05) (0:03)
4 8:13 8:36 ¡0:23 ¡0:10¤ ¡0:09 ¡0:01
(0:34) (0:06) (0:06) (0:04)
5 6:68 5:98 0:71¤¤ ¡0:26¤¤¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:19¤¤
(0:32) (0:08) (0:08) (0:08)
All ¡0:09¤¤ ¡0:07¤ ¡0:02
(0:04) (0:04) (0:02)
(1)-(3) ¡0:06 0:03 ¡0:10
(0:09) (0:10) (0:10)
(5)-(3) ¡0:21¤¤¤ ¡0:01 ¡0:20¤¤
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08)Table 7: Performance Consequences Using Alternative Risk Shifting Measures
This table reports the abnormal monthly returns of portfolios of mutual funds sorted according
to the most recent risk shifting measure. We compute six di®erent measures of risk shifting: the
standard deviation of the fund returns using all holdings; the proportion of the portfolio invested
in cash and other non-equity securities; the standard deviation of the returns using only equity
positions; the systematic risk, de¯ned as the CAPM beta; and the idiosyncratic risk, de¯ned as
the standard deviation of the residuals from the CAPM and Carhart regressions, respectively. All
returns are expressed in % per month. Portfolios 1 to 5 are de¯ned similarly to Table 2 with
di®erent cuto®s for each RS measure: f§1%;§2:5%g for all holdings; f§2:5%;§7:5%g for cash
proportions; f§1%;§2%g for equity holdings; f§:05;§0:15g for CAPM beta; and f§1%;§2%g for
both idiosyncratic risk measures. The signi¯cance levels are abbreviated with asterisks: One, two,
and three asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively.
RS All Proportion Equity CAPM Idiosync. Idiosync.
Portfolio Holdings of Equity Holdings Beta Volatility Volatility
(CAPM) (Carhart)
1 ¡0:07 ¡0:05 ¡0:07 ¡0:10 ¡0:04 0:04
(0:08) (0:05) (0:08) (0:07) (0:08) (0:10)
2 ¡0:04 ¡0:04 ¡0:08 ¡0:04 ¡0:04 0:01
(0:05) (0:04) (0:06) (0:05) (0:06) (0:05)
3 ¡0:06 ¡0:07 ¡0:05 ¡0:06 ¡0:07 ¡0:05
(0:05) (0:04) (0:05) (0:05) (0:05) (0:05)
4 ¡0:09 ¡0:09¤¤ ¡0:10¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:09 ¡0:12¤
(0:06) (0:05) (0:06) (0:05) (0:06) (0:07)
5 ¡0:22¤¤¤ ¡0:13¤¤ ¡0:22¤¤¤ ¡0:12¤ ¡0:25¤¤¤ ¡0:26¤¤¤
(0:08) (0:05) (0:07) (0:07) (0:09) (0:09)
(1)-(3) ¡0:01 0:01 ¡0:02 ¡0:03 0:03 0:09
(0:08) (0:04) (0:07) (0:07) (0:08) (0:10)
(5)-(3) ¡0:16¤¤ ¡0:06¤ ¡0:17¤¤¤ ¡0:05 ¡0:18¤¤ ¡0:21¤¤
(0:07) (0:03) (0:06) (0:07) (0:08) (0:09)Table 8: Performance of Funds by Risk Shifting and Other Fund Characteristics
This table reports the frequency distribution and the Carhart alphas of portfolios of mutual funds
sorted according to risk shifting and other fund characteristics that are related to trading costs and
prior fund performance (turnover, prior year °ow, prior year return, and realized volatility over
prior 3 years). Mutual funds are ¯rst sorted into two equal-sized groups according to whether the
characteristic is above or below its median value. In a second step, funds are further divided into ¯ve
groups according to their risk shifting level. The table reports the average proportion of funds that
fall into one of the ten groups and the Carhart alphas of the ten portfolios and the di®erences in the
Carhart alphas between selected portfolios. All returns are expressed in % per month. Portfolios 1
to 5 are de¯ned in Table 2 with cuto® RS measures of f§1%;§2:5%g. The signi¯cance levels are
abbreviated with asterisks: One, two, and three asterisks denote signi¯cance at the 10, 5, and 1%
level, respectively.
Panel A: Funds Sorted by Turnover (TO)
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Low TO High TO L¡H Low TO High TO L¡H
1 5:21 8:99 ¡3:79¤¤¤ ¡0:12 ¡0:09 ¡0:03
(0:77) (0:13) (0:08) (0:13)
2 7:02 8:34 ¡1:32¤¤ ¡0:04 ¡0:07 0:04
(0:63) (0:06) (0:06) (0:05)
3 24:10 17:22 6:88¤¤¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:07 0:01
(0:43) (0:05) (0:05) (0:03)
4 8:71 7:75 0:97¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:13¤¤ 0:08¤
(0:52) (0:06) (0:06) (0:04)
5 4:95 7:70 ¡2:74¤¤¤ ¡0:31¤¤¤ ¡0:15¤ ¡0:16
(0:56) (0:10) (0:08) (0:10)
All ¡0:07¤ ¡0:10¤¤ 0:03
(0:04) (0:04) (0:03)
(1)-(3) ¡0:06 ¡0:02 ¡0:04
(0:13) (0:07) (0:13)
(5)-(3) ¡0:25¤¤ ¡0:08 ¡0:17¤
(0:10) (0:07) (0:10)
Panel B: Funds Sorted by Prior Year Flows
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Low Flow High Flow L¡H Low Flow High Flow L¡H
1 7:04 7:16 ¡0:11 ¡0:14¤ ¡0:01 ¡0:14
(0:66) (0:07) (0:11) (0:12)
2 7:37 8:00 ¡0:63¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:07 0:00
(0:37) (0:06) (0:06) (0:07)
3 20:40 20:94 ¡0:54 ¡0:06 ¡0:06 ¡0:00
(0:72) (0:05) (0:05) (0:04)
4 8:58 7:88 0:71¤ ¡0:08 ¡0:10¤ 0:01
(0:37) (0:07) (0:06) (0:05)
5 6:55 6:08 0:48 ¡0:18¤¤ ¡0:13¤ ¡0:05
(0:49) (0:08) (0:08) (0:09)
All ¡0:09¤ ¡0:08¤ ¡0:01
(0:05) (0:04) (0:04)
(1)-(3) ¡0:08 0:05 ¡0:13
(0:06) (0:11) (0:12)
(5)-(3) ¡0:12¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:05
(0:07) (0:07) (0:08)Panel C: Funds Sorted by Prior Year Fund Performance
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Low Ret. High Ret. L¡H Low Ret. High Ret. L¡H
1 8:54 5:67 2:88¤¤¤ ¡0:06 ¡0:01 ¡0:05
(1:02) (0:10) (0:11) (0:15)
2 7:89 7:47 0:43 ¡0:07 0:01 ¡0:08
(0:36) (0:07) (0:05) (0:09)
3 19:87 21:47 ¡1:60 ¡0:07 ¡0:04 ¡0:03
(0:99) (0:06) (0:05) (0:07)
4 8:06 8:40 ¡0:34 ¡0:13¤ ¡0:05 ¡0:09
(0:50) (0:07) (0:06) (0:07)
5 5:58 7:06 ¡1:48¤ ¡0:23¤¤ ¡0:11 ¡0:12
(0:76) (0:10) (0:08) (0:12)
All ¡0:13¤¤ ¡0:04 ¡0:08
(0:06) (0:04) (0:08)
(1)-(3) 0:01 0:03 ¡0:02
(0:09) (0:11) (0:13)
(5)-(3) ¡0:16¤¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:09
(0:08) (0:06) (0:09)
Panel D: Funds Sorted by Realized Volatility over the Prior Three Years
RS Frequency Future Carhart Alphas
Portfolio Low Vol. High Vol. L¡H Low Vol. High Vol. L¡H
1 3:27 10:94 ¡7:67¤¤¤ ¡0:07 ¡0:10 0:03
(1:61) (0:05) (0:10) (0:11)
2 6:51 8:85 ¡2:34¤¤¤ ¡0:05 ¡0:01 ¡0:04
(0:86) (0:05) (0:06) (0:06)
3 25:19 16:15 9:05¤¤¤ ¡0:07¤ ¡0:00 ¡0:07
(0:92) (0:04) (0:06) (0:05)
4 9:33 7:13 2:20¤¤¤ ¡0:04 ¡0:14¤ 0:09
(0:54) (0:05) (0:07) (0:06)
5 5:64 7:00 ¡1:36¤¤ ¡0:09 ¡0:27¤¤¤ 0:18¤
(0:68) (0:06) (0:10) (0:11)
All ¡0:07¤¤ ¡0:09¤ 0:02
(0:04) (0:05) (0:05)
(1)-(3) 0:00 ¡0:09 0:10
(0:05) (0:10) (0:11)
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Figure 1: Persistence of Risk Shifting.
The ¯gure depicts the average risk shifting level for the ¯ve risk shifting portfolios four


























Figure 2: Future Performance of Portfolios by Risk Shifting Measure.
This ¯gure depicts the abnormal monthly returns of portfolios of mutual funds sorted ac-
cording to the most recent risk shifting measure. The ¯gure summarizes the intercepts from
factor regressions based on the CAPM, Fama-French, Carhart, and Ferson-Schadt models.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Function.
We report the cumulative distribution functions of the fund rankings for mutual funds in
di®erent risk shifting groups. We sort mutual funds into the ¯ve portfolios according to their
most recent risk shifting measure. At the end of every quarter we compute the cumulative
distribution function of the percentile ranking of funds based on the Carhart alphas over the
subsequent 12-month period for each of the ¯ve portfolios. Finally, we depict the average
levels of the quarterly cumulative distribution functions. The ¯gure shows the cumulative
distributions for three di®erent groups of mutual funds. The curve RS1 corresponds to funds
in portfolio (1) that reduce their risk by more than 2.5%, RS5 to funds that increase their
risk by more than 2.5%, and RS3 for funds that change their risk by less than 1%. All returns
are expressed in % per month.